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SIX COPYRIGHT THEORIES FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF COMPUTER OBJECT 
PROGRAMS* 
I. Trotter Hardy,Jr. ** 
In recent years, many courts have addressed the question whether a 
computer program, in a form ready for immediate use by a computer, is 
copyrightable. After some initial negative answers, 1 most courts2 and com-
mentators3 have agreed that these programs are indeed copyrightable. 
A decision that computer programs in any form are protectible under 
the Copyright Act4 is intuitively satisfying. Programs, after all, take a lot of 
creativity and effort to create;5 their market value can be stolen by a simple 
act of copying; consequently the need for protection to serve as an incentive 
to creation seems at least as great for computer programs as for any other 
copyrightable commodity.6 Unfortunately, none of the court decisions that 
have found programs in their final, usable form to be copyrightable is consis-
tent with the language of the Copyright Act. 
Under the terms of the Act, computer programs, in a form ready for use 
* Research for this article was supported by a summer research grant from the College of 
William and Mary. 
** Assistant Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary. 
1. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812, 817-22, 824-25 
(E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240, 1246-49 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984); 
Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1067-68 (N.D. Ill. 1979), affd on 
other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980). 
2. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 524-25 (9th Cir. 1984); 
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1246-49 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. 
dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artie Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 876-77 (3d 
Cir. 1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 750-52 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
3. See, e.g., Note, Copyright Protection of Computer Program Object Code, 96 HARV. L. REv. 
1723, 1743-44 (1983); Note, Copyright: Computer Firmware: Is It Copyrightable?, 36 OKLA. L. REv. 
119, 134-35 (1983). But see Stern, Another Look at Copyright Protection of Software: Did the 1980 
Act Do Anything for Object· Code?, 3 CoMPUTER L.J. 1, 16-17 (1981). 
4. 17 u.s.c. § 101-810 (1976). 
5. For example, Apple Computer, Inc., estimated that certain of its computer programs, cop-
ied by a competitor, "took 46 man-months to produce at a cost of over $740,000, not including the 
time or cost of creating or acquiring earlier versions of the programs or the expense of marketing the 
programs." Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1245 (3d Cir. 1983), 
cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984). 
6. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 751 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
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by a computer, cannot sustain an independent copyright as literary works 
because they are not original works of authorship. For the same reason, 
they cannot sustain copyright protection as derivative works. Because they 
do not reflect the merger of two expressions, they cannot sustain protection 
as joint works either. Though not independently copyrightable, these pro-
grams may yet be protectible under several related copyright theories. First, 
authors may rely on their right to control the preparation of derivative 
works to prevent the reproduction of their programs. Second, these pro-
grams might simply be "copies" of earlier, copyrightable forms of the same 
programs. Third, authors may rely on the "pattern" of the earlier forms of 
programs to control the copying of that pattern in the forms ready for use by 
a computer. 
To follow these theories, one needs to understand that computer pro-
grams can exist in different forms. Many explanations of programs have 
appeared in the legal literature already,? but for the reader who is unfamiliar 
with them, a short explanation is in order. 
FORMS OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS 
When programmers write programs, they write in one or more pro-
gramming languages or perhaps in some form of notational system or flow 
chart that will later be turned into expressions in a programming language. 
The resulting program, written on paper or displayed on a video display 
terminal, is readable by the programmer, but not directly usable by the com-
puter. Before the program can be used or "run" by the computer, it must be 
translated into a more detailed series of instructions, expressed in a kind of 
code consisting of the digits one and zero. 
The analogy of a player piano roll may be helpful here. A composer 
may write music to be performed by a player piano, but the composer will 
not likely compose by punching holes in the piano roll. Rather, he will write 
musical notation on music paper. Someone or something must then trans-
late that notation into the holes in the piano roll before the piano can play 
the composition. The translation from musical notation to holes on a roll is 
similar to the translation of a programmer's program, as it was written, into 
a version that the computer can "play." Computer experts refer to the ver-
sion written by the programmer as the "source program;" the translated ver-
sion, ready for the computer to run, is called the "object program." 
One breakdown in this analogy is that a musical translation can be re-
versed: an expert given a piano roll could, with patience and effort, 
reproduce the sheet music for the work. Most computer program transla-
tions from source to object form are not reversible: an expert given an object 
program produced from a source program language, like Basic or Cobol, 
cannot reproduce the original source program. The program's functions-
its processes, its logic, its sequence of programmed events-could be repro-
7. See discussions cited supra note 3. See also Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Mer-
rill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358, 1366-67 (D. Del. 1983); Apple Com-
puter, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812, 812-16 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd, 714 F.2d 
1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984). 
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duced in a source program language like Basic or Cobol, but there would be 
no way of knowing how close such a program's phrasing or word choice 
would be to the original source program. 8 
In the sense that object programs cannot be translated back to their 
source program form, programs are much like instructions of any kind. One 
might, for example, ask a mason to build a brick wall of a certain height, 
length, width and pattern. An experienced mason would be able to follow 
these directions, but someone with no knowledge of or experience with 
bricks could not. For that inexperienced builder, the instructions would 
have to be broken down into far more detail, including how to prepare the 
foundation, how to mix the mortar, how to ensure that the wall is straight, 
what to do at the comers, and so on. Here, the original instructions are like 
a high-level source program; the detailed breakdown of the instructions is 
like an object program. A computer is much like a completely inexperienced 
builder in that its instructions must ultimately be broken down to a very low 
level of detail before the computer can execute them. 
The significant point is that once the brick-wall instructions are broken 
down in this way, the precise wording and some of the sequence of the origi-
nal instructions about height, width, length and pattern may well be lost. 
The lengthier the original, high-level instructions, the more certain it is that 
the detailed instructions cannot be used to reconstruct them. It is the same 
with computer programs. Why this inability to convert from a very detailed 
expression back to a high level one makes a difference will be discussed 
later.9 
OBJECT PROGRAMS UNDER THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT 
Source programs are unquestionably protected by copyright; the rub 
comes with object programs. The first problem with object programs is de-
termining what they are in the terms of the 1976 Copyright Act. Curiously, 
courts have addressed just about every other problem surrounding object 
programs but this one. Among the issues that have already been raised and 
resolved are these: 
(1) Whether object programs are readable by human beings and 
whether readability is relevant to copyrightability? They are readable only 
by highly trained experts, but the 1976 Act does not require readability be-
cause the Act overturned White-Smith v. Apollo; IO 
8. See infra note 61 and accompanying text. 
9. See infra text accompanying note 75. 
10. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908), had held that a player 
piano roll was not a "copy" of the musical composition it caused to be played, because a composition 
"is not susceptible of being copied until it has been put in a form which others can see and read." 
209 U.S. at 17. The House Report on the 1976 Copyright Act observed that the "broad language [of 
the 1976 Act] is intended to avoid the artificial and largely unjustifiable distinctions, derived from 
cases such as White-Smith Publishing Co. . . . , under which statutory copyrightability in certain 
cases has been made to depend upon the form or medium in which the work is fixed. Under the bill 
[later enacted] it makes no difference what the form, manner, or medium of fixation may be-
whether ... it is capable of perception directly or by means of any machine or device .... " H.R. 
REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 
5665. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 524-25 (9th Cir. 1984); 
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1248 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dis-
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(2) Whether object programs in a computer chip or "read-only-mem-
ory," are fixed in a tangible medium of expression? They are, because they 
can be perceived or communicated from the chip; 11 and 
(3) Whether object programs on a chip are so much a part of the com-
puter as a machine that they are functional, mechanical devices and hence 
outside the scope of copyright's subject matter? They are not, because they 
are no more a part of a machine than is a musical work on a record or tape 
player.12 
In addition to decisions resolving various issues in favor of protecting 
object programs, the 1976 Act's legislative history shows that Congress in-
tended to provide exactly that protection. The major element of that history 
is the final report of a congressionally-appointed National Commission on 
New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU).13 The CONTU 
final report concluded that computer programs should be copyrightable; the 
conclusion made no distinction between source and object programs. 14 Con-
gress ultimately adopted the CONTU recommendation almost verbatim in a 
1980 amendment to the 1976 Act, including in the statute a definition for 
"computer program" that seems to incorporate both source and object pro-
grams.15 Several federal courts have determined, with little difficulty, that 
CONTU intended, as must have the Congress, that both source and object 
programs be protected by copyright.16 
Neither CONTU nor the case law, however, has yet determined the 
proper copyright category for object programs. The CONTU majority 
spoke of "computer programs" with but a few express references to source 
or object programs throughout the Final ReportP In a dissenting opinion, 
Commissioner Hersey went to considerable lengths to distinguish these two 
missed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 750-51 (N.D. Ill. 
1983). 
11. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 
1983), cerL dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artie Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 
874 (3d Cir. 1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artie Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999, 1007-08 (N.D. Ill. 1982), 
aff'd, 704 F.2d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 90 (1983); Tandy Corp. v. Per-
sonal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 173 (N.D. Cal. 1981). 
12. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249, 1251 (3d 
Cir. 1983) (quoting National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works 
(CONTU), Library of Congress, Final Report 21 (1978)), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984); 
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 751-52 (N.D. Ill. 1983). But see Comm'r Hersey's 
dissent to the CONTU Final Report [hereinafter cited as CONTU Report]. 
13. Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, tit. II, 88 Stat. 1873 (establishing CONTU). 
14. CONTU Report, supra note 12, at 1, 12, 14. 
15. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, ch. 38, § 10(a), (b), 94 Stat. 3028 (amending 17 
U.S. C. §§ 101, 117 (1976)). The amendment adopted this definition: "A 'computer program' is a set 
of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a 
certain result." Though the legislative history to the 1980 amendment is silent on this point, see 
H.R. REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 
6460, 6482-83, Congress evidently intended "direct or indirect" to refer to object programs and 
source programs respectively. Accord, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 
524-25 (9th Cir. 1984); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 749-50 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
16. E.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir. 1984); Apple 
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 
S. Ct. 690 (1984); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 750 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
17. The CONTU Report mentions "source" and "object" programs in only three places: pages 
21 & n.109, and page 25. In none of these discussions is the distinction suggested to be relevant to 
copyright. 
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versions of a program for copyright purposes. He noted three possible clas-
sifications of object programs: derivative works, literary works, and copies; 
each of the three proposed at one time or another by the CONTU subcom-
mittee reporting on software.18 Because the software subcommittee wanted 
copyright protection to attach to object programs, its shifting terminology 
must reflect an uncertainty not about the proper statutory treatment, but 
about how the wording of the 1976 Act should be used to achieve that treat-
ment. The Commission's failure to do more than just mention object pro-
grams in the final report, 19 particularly in the face of Commissioner Hersey's 
explicit discussion in his dissenting opinion, strongly suggests that the prob-
lem of statutory classification of object programs proved intractable and was 
simply ignored. 
Why is the classification of object programs into a statutory pigeon hole 
so difficult, and why does it matter? It matters because some pigeon holes 
appear to offer no protection, and proponents of copyright protection natu-
rally would like to avoid them. Why the classification is difficult can only be 
seen if one goes through the possible theories one by one. There are at least 
six possibilities. 
Theory One: Independently Copyrightable Literary Works 
Calling object programs "literary works" perhaps makes the most sense 
in terms of the Act and its legislative history, and is not inconsistent with 
calling them derivative works as well. A derivative work, after all, may also 
be a "literary work." Literary works are defined in the 1976 Act as "works 
. . . expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or 
indicia .... "2° Certainly both source and object programs meet this broad 
definition. Indeed, the House Report on the 1976 Act, quoted in CONTU's 
final report, says expressly that "the term 'literary works' includes . . . com-
puter programs to the extent that they incorporate authorship in the 
programmer's expression of original ideas, as distinguished from the ideas 
themselves."21 
Here again is the absence of any distinction between source programs 
and object programs. The point to focus on, of course, is the House Report's 
emphasis on the need for a "literary work" to have "authorship in the 
programmer's expression of ... ideas." That requirement might limit "lit-
erary works" to any work that incorporates "the programmer's expression," 
and hence to the only work created by the programmer, the source program. 
Under this reading of the House Report, the category "literary work" would 
not include the work created by the computer, the object program. A read-
ing of the Report in context, however, shows that the distinction sought was 
not that between "programmer's expression" and "computer's expression," 
but was rather the familiar copyright distinction between the expression of 
18. CONTU Report, supra note 12, at 32. 
19. See supra note 17. 
20. 17 u.s.c. § 101 (1982). 
21. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. 
NEWS 5659, 5667, quoted in CONTU Report, supra note 12, at 16. 
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an idea and the idea itself.22 The language of the House Report therefore 
ties in to the proscriptions in section 102(b) of the 1976 Copyright Act 
against copyright protection of "any idea, procedure, process," etc. and does 
not qualify section lOl's definition of "literary works."23 
In sum, classifying object programs as literary works makes perfect 
sense. That classification suggests the theory that object programs are copy-
rightable as independent, original works of authorship. But surely this the-
ory fails: no author, at least no human author, has created anything in an 
object program. All the originality, the authorship, the expression, and the 
creativity are vested in the source program. The object program is mechani-
cally produced without an author's contribution at all. No court has even 
suggested that an object program reflects creativity or expression indepen-
dently from its source program. 
Calling object programs literary works therefore makes sense only in 
the abstract; it does not provide a theory for the protection of object 
programs. 
Theory Two: Independently Copyrightable Derivative Works 
Several courts have implied, however, that object programs are deriva-
tive works and can achieve copyright protection under that label.24 A deriv-
ative work is one that is "based upon one or more preexisting works, such as 
a translation .... "25 The computer's translation of the source program 
creates a new work that is "based upon" a pre-existing work; hence the ob-
ject program may be considered a derivative work. Indeed, it would be diffi-
cult to classify an object program as anything else. The House Report notes 
that "the terms 'compilations' and 'derivative works' . . . comprehend every 
... work that employs pre-existing material or data of any kind."26 An 
object program not only "employs" preexisting data; it is made entirely from 
pre-existing data. 
22. The House Report goes on to discuss the expression-idea distinction specifically discussing 
the concern that copyright in programs might unjustifiably "extend ... to the methodology or 
processes" of the program. There is, however, no further discussion of any "programmer expres-
sion" versus "computer expression" distinction. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57, re-
printed in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5670. 
23. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(b), 101 (1982). 
24. E.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1248, 1251-52 (3d 
Cir. 1983) (calling object programs a translation and implying their derivative status); cert. dis-
missed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 750-51 (N.D. Ill. 
1983) ("object code is nothing other than a direct transformation of a computer program composed 
... in source code" (emphasis added)); Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. 
Supp. 171, 173 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (calling object programs a "translation"). See also Apple Computer 
Inc. v. Computer Edge Pty. Ltd., 28 PAT., TRADEMARK & CORP. J. 256 (B.N.A. July 12, 1984) 
(Federal Court of Australia concludes that object programs can be protected as "translations" or 
"adaptations" of source code); Argy, Legal Protection of Computer Software in Australia? I J. LAW 
& INFORMATION SCIENCE 256, 259 (1983) (concluding that object programs are translations within 
the meaning of the Australian copyright act) (the JOURNAL OF LAW & INFORMATION SCIENCE is 
published at the New South Wales Institute of Technology in Australia). 
25. 17 u.s.c. § 101 (1982). 
26. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. 
NEWS 5659, 5670. The House Report actually says that the terms "compilations" and "derivative 
works" include "every copyrightable work that employs pre-existing material. ..• " (emphasis ad-
ded). If an object program is not itself copyrightable, as this paper argues, then this phrase suggests 
that an object program cannot be a derivative work. But the word "copyrightable" either means 
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Derivative works are part of the subject matter of copyright and may 
sustain a copyright independent of the original, or underlying, work. 27 An 
object program is therefore, by virtue of its status as a derivative work, eligi-
ble for copyright protection, but only if it meets the usual copyright requi-
sites of being an "original work[ ] of authorship fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression, . . . from which [the work] can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a 
machine or device."28 In short, if both the underlying source program and 
the derivative object program are to sustain separate copyrights, then each 
must independently meet the test of being an original work of authorship. 29 
The House Report notes the well-established doctrine that copyright on a 
derivative work "covers only the material added by the later author 
• • • ."
30 Whatever material was present originally in the underlying work 
is protected in the derivative work, if protected at all, by the underlying 
work's copyright, not by a separate derivative work copyright. 
Once again, even as a derivative work, an object program fails the test 
of being an original work of authorship. It has no "later author," other than 
the underlying source program's author; it cannot be an independent work 
of authorship because it is produced automatically by a machine. It is there-
fore not copyrightable by the plain terms of the statute.31 The legislative 
history also suggests, though in the context of sound recordings, that a work 
created by "purely mechanical means" lacks originality and cannot achieve 
copyright protection for that reason. 32 An object program is, of course, ere-
something else in this context, or its use was inadvertent: elsewhere the House Report shows that 
derivative works need not be copyrightable. See infra text accompanying notes 47-48. 
In some circumstances, programs are pieced together from snippets of other programs, and thus 
might be called compilations instead of derivative works. But this piecing together is almost always 
done in the source code version; it provides no new theory for the protection of object programs. 
27. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1982). 
28. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). See also H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51-57, re-
printed in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5664-70. 
29. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b); H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57, reprinted in 1976 U.S. 
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5670. 
30. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. 
NEWS 5659, 5670 (emphasis added). See also Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 1979), 
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952 (1980). 
31. Accord, L. Batlin & Son., Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490-91 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 857 (1976), discussed in this same vein by Stem, supra note 3, at 14 n.53. Stem concludes 
that object programs cannot be derivative works in part because the object programs are not fixed. 
Stem, supra note 3, at 14. This conclusion is wrong for two reasons: first, object programs can 
indeed be fixed, see supra text accompanying note 11; second, the 1976 Act does not impose are-
quirement of fixation on derivative works. See infra text accompanying notes 47-48. 
32. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 56, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. 
NEWS 5659, 5669. Whether this phrase ought to apply to object programs is debatable. Doubtless 
Congress intended that a mechanical fixation would involve no changes and would be a duplication 
of some preexisting work; hence, the fixation would lack originality. An object program, though 
mechanically fixed, can still be one of a kind and perhaps could therefore be termed "original." Yet, 
the term "original" is often used by courts to refer to a requirement for creative authorship and not 
just to "an absence of copying." In this sense, then, the House Report may be saying exactly what 
the discussion above says: purely mechanical fixation lacks authorship. 
One court has, for example, used the term "originality" in just this way to deny copyright to a 
translation of a list of English words into Arabic. See Signo Trading Int'l Ltd. v. Gordon, 535 F. 
Supp. 362 (N.D. Cal. 1981). Though recognizing the possibility that the initial list of English words 
might be copyrightable, id. at 364, the court concluded that "the translation of the word list [into 
Arabic] ... is a fairly mechanical process, requiring little if any originality," id., and so was not 
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ated by "purely mechanical means." Object programs therefore fail there-
quirements for independent protection as derivative works. 
The CONTU's Final Report indirectly supports this conclusion in a 
discussion of the use of a computer to create new works, such as stories, 
poems, drawings, music, etc. CONTU noted that a musical work created by 
a computer could indeed be copyrightable, as long as the would-be copyright 
owner "exercised sufficient control over the production of the work to be 
considered its author."33 However much control is sufficient for authorship 
under this test, it is plain that some control is required-and a source pro-
gram author typically has no control over the translating program's produc-
tion of object programs. 34 
Speaking more generally, CONTU noted that the copyrightability of "a 
work created through application of computer technology . . . depends not 
on the device or devices used in its creation, but rather upon the presence of 
at least minimal human creative effort at the time the work is produced."35 
Though not addressing the copyright status of object programs as such, 
CONTU's remarks are entirely consistent with copyright doctrine generally 
and should certainly apply to the use of a computer to produce object pro-
grams. Just as certainly, the production of an object program is not accom-
panied by "minimal human creative effort at the time." 
In short, object programs fail to meet the requirements for copyright-
ability either as independent literary works or as derivative works. 
Theory Three: Joint Works 
Yet another theory is that object programs should be considered ·~oint 
works" under the 1976 Act.36 The translation process on a computer in-
volves three programs: the source program, the translating program, and 
the resulting object program. Typically, the source program and the trans-
lating program are written by different people. The joint works theory sug-
gests that the creations of the source program author and the author of the 
translating program combine to form a new work, the object program. Per-
haps if both authors are in the picture, the object program's lack of in-
dependent creativity or originality will cease to be a problem. 
The author of the translating program has a lot to do with the object 
programs produced by that program. The source program's author has 
nothing to do with the translating process, but he does provide the "raw 
copyrightable. The plaintiff in Signa apparently used human translators to make the translation; if 
human translation can be a mechanical process, surely a computer translation would be even more 
so. 
33. CONTU Report, supra note 12, at 46 n.188. 
34. Programmers may be offered some options, such as faster translation in exchange for a 
slower-running object program, or vice-versa, or to obtain certain printouts of the program as it is 
translated, or to obtain printouts of the object program version. Other than the first, rarely offered 
option, these opportunities for variation are trivial and have nothing to do with control over the 
object program itself. Even with the first option, "control" takes the form of a desire for a result, not 
the exercise of means or expressions to reach that result. 
35. CONTU Report, supra note 12, at 45. 
36. This theory was suggested by the late Professor Alan Latman, of New York University, at a 
conference titled "Software Protection" held in Washington, D.C., March 9, 1984. 
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material" for that process; it makes sense to say that both parties substan-
tially contribute to the finished product. 
Case law interpretations of joint works show that joint authors need not 
work together or even at the same time. One author can write the lyrics for 
a song, then later a composer unknown to the lyricist can add the music. 
The result is a joint work.37 The "joint work" cases show, in sum, that one 
author can complete a work, can tum the product of his effort over to some-
one else, and with no further effort or authorship on his part can become one 
of the owners of copyright in a new, joint work. Object programs seem to fit 
this pattern quite well: the source program author completes the source pro-
gram, turns it over to someone (or something) else, and with no further ef-
fort, authorship, or creativity on his part, a new, joint work is created. The 
objection to copyrighting object programs, that they lack authorship, is in-
deed mitigated by this view: the extra ounce of necessary authorship comes 
from the author of the translating program. 
The primary test of joint authorship is that the authors intend "that 
their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a 
unitary whole."38 Source program authors certainly intend their programs 
to be translated and run on a computer; just as certainly, authors of translat-
ing programs intend that those programs be used to translate the source 
programs of others. Even the intent test of joint authorship seems to be met 
by object programs. 
Two drawbacks to the joint work theory, though, are compelling. First, 
can Congress really have intended that one person, the author of the trans-
lating program, through a one-time effort in writing that program, should 
thereafter become a joint author of thousands of object programs produced 
by thousands of unknown programmers using his translator? Regardless of 
Congress's intent, does it make sense to give the translating program's au-
thor a right to a share in the profits of every single program translated by his 
program and then sold? If this right were not waived, the practical difficul-
ties of negotiating agreements with thousands or tens of thousands of source 
program authors would be enormous. More likely, sellers of translating pro-
grams would simply waive their rights of joint authorship. F~w program-
mers would expect, in the first place, that the author of a translating 
program would be a co-owner of any object programs they produced. To 
discover simultaneously that such a right existed but had been waived would 
be confusing indeed, even silly. If this kind of automatic waiver did evolve 
as the rule, the possibility of joint authorship would have provided no addi-
tional incentive to the creation of translating programs-leaving the situa-
tion just as it is right now. And if reliance on the joint authorship theory of 
computer program copyrights would provide no additional incentives to 
anybody, but would simply require the printing of boilerplate waivers, then 
the theory obviously leaves much to be desired. 
From another perspective, the joint authorship theory simply fails out-
37. See, e.g., Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266, 267 (2d 
Cir. 1944). 
38. 17 u.s.c. § 101 (1982). 
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right. The test of joint authorship is the authors' intent that their separate 
contributions be "merged."39 A merger can be into an inseparable whole, 
like a movie on which script writers, actors, producers, and a host of others 
collaborate;40 or it can be into "interdependent parts" of a whole, like a song 
on which both a composer and a lyricist have joined efforts.41 
Whatever the type of merger, both the case law and the Copyright Act 
unarguably say that some kind of merger must happen. That merger has, in 
every case addressing the issue, been a merger of expressions of authorship.42 
Whatever it is that has "merged" into an object program, it does not look 
like two expressions. The contribution of the translating program's author 
was to express the rules for translation in the form of a computer program. 
The object programs produced by that program reflect not the expression of 
those rules, but the end result of the operation of the rules: a translation. 
The operation of rules is not the "expression" that copyright is supposed to 
protect. Courts considering protection of the rules for games, for example, 
uniformly allow protection only for the written description of the rules, not 
for the rules in the abstract.43 As CONTU notes, owners of copyright in the 
written rules of a game cannot stop others from using the rules to play the 
game;44 nor can the copyright owner of a description of a system of account-
ing own a copyright in the execution of the system. 45 Because the operation 
of rules about translating is not a copyrightable expression, there can be no 
merger of expressions in the object program, and that program cannot be a 
joint work. 
Once again, CONTU's Final Report, in discussing copyright protection 
for computer-created works, supports this conclusion. CONTU briefly ex-
amined the situation in which one person-a composer, for example-se-
lected the input data to go into a music-composing program written by a 
second person. Would the second person be a joint author of the resulting 
musical work? CONTU apparently thought not: "It appears to the Com-
mission that authorship of the [music-composing] program ... is entirely 
separate from authorship of the final work. ... "46 
The analogy to the production of object programs is striking. The 
source program author selects his expressions and passes them as input to a 
translating program. The author of the translating program has created 
something that is entirely separate from what the source program author has 
39. 17 U.S. C.§ 101 (1982); 1M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, Release No. 15, § 6.03, at 
6-7 (1983). 
40. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 39, § 6.02 at 6-4. 
41. Id. 
42. See, e.g., Richmond v. Weiner, 353 F.2d 41, 46-47 (9th Cir. 1965) (involving the co-author-
ship of a book); cert. denied, 384 U.S. 928 (1966); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music 
Co., 161 F.2d 406,409-10 (2d Cir. 1946) (involving the joint composition of a song), cert. denied, 331 
U.S. 820 (1946); Mister B Textiles Inc. v. Woodcrest Fabrics, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 21, 24-25 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981) (involving the joint production of a fabric design). Cj Kenbrooke Fabrics, Inc. v. Material 
Things, 223 U.S.P.Q. 1039 (BNA) (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (one party's offering of a fabric design suggestion 
is not a "tangible contribution" to the other party's actual designs; no joint work is created). 
43. See, e.g., Affiliated Enterprises v. Gruber, 86 F.2d 958, 960-61 (1st Cir. 1936); Whist Club 
v. Foster, 42 F.2d 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1929); Seltzer v. Sunbrock, 22 F. Supp. 621, 630 (S.D. Cal. 1938). 
44. CONTU Report, supra note 12, at 20. 
45. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
46. CONTU Report, supra note 12, at 45. 
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"created" by use of the translating program. Hence, the two authors are not 
joint authors of the resulting object program. 
The joint works theory, then, like the independent literary works theory 
and the independently copyrightable derivative works theory, fails to offer 
protection to object programs. 
OTHER THEORIES OF PROTECTION 
The conclusion that object programs are not independently copyright-
able does not end the matter, for the Copyright Act may still provide a 
mechanism for protection. Three other theories of protection can be ex-
amined: first, copying an object program is the equivalent of preparing a 
derivative work; second, an object program is a "copy" of its source pro-
gram; and third, copying an object program constitutes copying certain pro-
tected portions-the "pattern" -of the underlying source program. 
Theory Four: The Right to ''Prepare" Derivative Works 
Authors of original underlying works, such as source programs, have 
the exclusive right to control the preparation of derivative works, such as 
object programs, whether or not the derivative work is copyrightable. Both 
the definition of "derivative work" and the legislative history makes that 
conclusion plain: a derivative work is "a work based upon one or more pre-
existing works .... "47 Nothing in the definition requires that a derivative 
work be fixed in a tangible medium, for example, and the House Report 
expressly acknowledges that an unrecorded improvised dance or skit based 
on a copyrighted work would constitute a derivative work, even though not 
independently copyrightable.48 Source program authors, then, are able to 
47. 17 u.s.c. § 101 (1982). 
48. "[P]reparation of a derivative work, such as a ballet, pantomime, or improvised perform-
ance, may be an infringement [of§ 106(2)] even though nothing is ever fixed in tangible form." H.R. 
REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 62, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 
5675. The idea that a work can infringe, even though it is not itself copyrightable subject matter, is 
not new. Professor Chafee pointed out the example of oral production of plays some forty years ago. 
See Z. Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 505 (1945). See also 
discussion of Kalem Company v. Harper Brothers, infra text accompanying notes 68-71. 
A distinction might, of course, be made between the House Report's example of something not 
fixed in a tangible medium and hence outside the subject matter of copyright, and something tangible 
like a copy of an object program that is within copyright subject matter but, for lack of authorship, 
falls short of the standard of protection. The distinction might be used to justify a conclusion that 
the latter works should not be controllable by the author as derivative works, even though the for-
mer are. This reasoning follows the highly developed patent law distinction between the subject 
matter protected and the standards for protection of that subject matter, see 1 P. ROSENBERG, PAT-
ENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS, ch. 6 at 6-2 (1984), but it makes little sense in copyright law. 
The Copyright Act itself does not clearly define the subject matter of copyright at all. Section 
102, titled "Subject matter of copyright: In general" does no more than say that "protection sub-
sists" in "original works of authorship" that are tangibly fixed, and then gives examples of "works of 
authorship." By itself, that section suggests, if anything, that the subject matter of copyright is 
"works of authorship" and that originality and tangibility are not subject matter requirements but 
standards to be met by proper subject matter. Under that view, it would not matter that the House 
Report's example of an intangible derivative work was different from the example of an object pro-
gram that is tangible but lacks authorship: both would show a failure of copyrightability because of 
a failure to meet the tests of protection. 
The question of subject matter versus tests for protection is complicated by the Act's use of the 
term "subject matter" to refer to several attributes of a work that by any common sense approach 
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control the preparation of derivative works without regard to whether those 
works are themselves copyrightable. 
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If the unauthorized copying of an object program could be said to con-
stitute the "preparation" of a derivative work, program producers would 
have a means of copyright protection. But can it? A typical example of a 
derivative work's preparation is that of a person who reads someone else's 
novel and then, without authorization, turns it into a movie or play. That 
person has plainly "prepared a derivative work" and can be stopped by the 
novel's author. Where the author himself or his licensee has prepared the 
derivative work, say, a movie, and the other person merely copies the movie 
without ever seeing or caring to see the underlying novel, the situation is also 
readily resolvable. The author will have a copyright in both the novel and 
the movie, and can proceed under his right to control the reproduction of 
the independently copyrighted movie without having to fall back on a theory 
that his right to prepare a derivative work has been infringed. 
The problem arises when the derivative work cannot be protected by 
copyright. For example, an author writes and hence copyrights a short 
story. With his approval, a dance troupe improvises an unrecorded dance 
that is based on the story. Without his approval, a second dance troupe sees 
the improvised dance and later copies it into one of its own performances. 
Can the author or the first dance troupe stop the second troupe's perform-
ance by arguing that the second troupe "prepared" a derivative work with-
out authority? 
A line of cases decided under the 1909 Copyright Act addresses a simi-
lar issue with regard to recordings of musical works. Under the Act, a musi-
cal composition could be copyrighted, but not a recording of a performance 
of that composition.49 A recording was, however, what would today be 
called a "derivative work."50 The owner of a copyright in a musical compo-
sition could control the first recording of a performance of the composi-
would be considered tests for or exceptions to protection. Section 105, for example, explains that if 
the United States Government authors a literary, dramatic, or any other work, it cannot obtain 
federal copyright protection for it. This section, too, though it seems to describe exceptions to pro-
tection for certain things otherwise well within the subject matter of copyright, is titled "Subject 
matter of copyright: United States Government works." 
The problem of defining the subject matter of copyright might well remain an academic one, but 
for the reference to it in a later section specifying that certain state laws are preempted by the 
copyright laws. Section 301 (a) says that state laws are preempted if they provide protection 
"equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright • • • in works of 
authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of 
copyright as specified in sections 102 and 103." (Emphasis added.) 
Because United States Government works seem to be excluded from the subject matter of copy-
right in the title to section 105, but not mentioned in sections 102 or 103, the statute allows the 
Government to obtain state or common law copyright protection in anything it authors. By the 
terms of section 301, this state law protection will not be pre-empted. No doubt Congress did not 
intend this result, but it follows from the Act's choice of section titles. 
At any rate, the statute only vaguely indicates what the subject matter of copyright is. Any 
argument that object programs and impromptu dances are distinguished by whether they are within 
or without copyright's subject matter thus flies in the face of Congress's indifference to that distinc-
tion as a significant one for copyright. 
49. 17 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1909). 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 41, § 2.IO[A] & [A][l]. As of 
February 15, 1972, recordings become subject to copyright by amendment of the 1909 Act, id., but 
the pre-1972 situation is of interest here. 
50. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 41, § 3.01 at 3-2, § 8.04[E] n.45 at 8-62. 
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tion.51 Once that authorized recording was made, however, anyone could 
obtain a compulsory license from the owner to "make similar use of the 
copyrighted work upon the payment . . . of a royalty" to that owner. 52 
Thus, the 1909 Act plainly allowed a compulsory license for anyone 
who wanted to hire an orchestra and make a recording; but eventually the 
question arose whether anyone could skip the orchestra hiring altogether 
and simply duplicate an existing record. In a 1972 case, Duchess Music 
Corp. v. Stern, 53 the Ninth Circuit concluded that simple duplication was 
unlawful. The facts neatly parallel the case of computer programs: a record, 
not itself copyrightable, could nevertheless not be copied by others. With 
computer programs, an object program is not itself copyrightable, yet the 
analogy argues for the copyright owner's authority to control the reproduc-
tion of object programs. 
The analogy is attractive and useful, though it is not compelling. First, 
the 1909 Act expressly granted copyright owners the right to control the 
making of a record of their musical compositions. Further, the Act set up 
the compulsory licensing scheme. Congress carried over in modified form 
that same scheme for musical compositions and records into the 1976 Act, 54 
but did not provide a similar scheme for computer programs. That Con-
gress, through the CONTU report, was well aware of computer programs by 
197 6 and did not make the sort of arrangement for programs that it made 
for musical compositions and records55 at least argues against a court's so 
doing. 
Second, a reasonable reading of the 1909 Act shows that the Duchess 
Music decision was simply incorrect. The 1909 Act had said that allowing 
copyright holders in musical compositions the right to control the first use of 
their compositions for recording was in exchange for allowing others a com-
pulsory license. "[W]henever the owner of a musical copyright has [allowed 
the composition to be recorded], any other person may make similar use of 
the copyrighted work" on compliance with requirements for payment of a 
royalty.56 The Ninth Circuit concluded, surprisingly, that making "similar 
use" of a work did not include making "exact and identical copies" of it. 57 
In short, Duchess Music construed the compulsory license provisions to 
apply only to making a new recording, not to duplicating an existing record-
ing. Though perhaps a desirable and sensible result, the decision did not 
square with contemporary understanding of the licensing provisions.58 
51. Section 1 of the 1909 Act allowed the owner of copyright in a musical work the exclusive 
right "to make any arrangement or setting of it or of the melody of it in . . . any form of record . . . 
from which it may be read or reproduced." 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1909). 
52. Id. 
53. Duchess Music Corp. v. Stem, 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1972). 
54. 17 u.s.c. § 115 (1976). 
55. The 1976 Act refers to musical compositions as "musical works," and records (and tapes 
and other devices) as "sound recordings," 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). 
56. 1909 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1909). 
57. Duchess Music Corp., 458 F.2d at 1310. 
58. Dissenting, Judge Byrne noted, for example, that Congress had enacted amendments to the 
Copyright Act in 1972 precisely because without the amendments "record pirates •.. 'can and do 
engage in widespread unauthorized reproduction of phonograph records and tapes without violating 
Federal copyright law.'" Duchess Music Corp., 458 F.2d at 1311 (Byrne, J., dissenting and quoting 
858 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26 
Other courts did follow the case, 59 however, so it remains good law, though 
unnecessary law in view of Congress's 1971 amendments allowing greater 
protection for recordings. 6o 
In any event, Duchess Music provides some basis for saying that the 
owner of copyright in a source program should be able to prevent anyone 
from copying the object program that derives from it. The principle of the 
case has in fact been extended outside the bounds of music to literary and 
dramatic works under the 1976 Act. Just last year, the Ninth Circuit reaf-
firmed Duchess Music in Lone Ranger Television, Inc. v. Program Radio 
Corp. 61 and, in doing so, drew analogies to the protection of an un-
copyrighted film that deried from a copyrighted novel. 62 
Lone Ranger TV itself offers additional support for the theory that 
copying an object program is the equivalent of preparing a derivative work. 
The plaintiff in that case owned the copyrights to various Lone Ranger radio 
scripts but conceded the absence of copyright protection in audio tapes that 
recorded performances of the scripts. The defendant had taken some of 
those tapes and "re-mixed the recordings into broadcast cartridges for radio 
play."63 Over the defendant's arguments that copying uncopyrightable tapes 
could not violate copyright law, the court drew on Duchess Music to con-
clude, as an interpretation of the 1976 Act, that the copying constituted the 
preparation of a derivative work. 64 
The facts of Lone Ranger TV make a slightly better case for finding an 
unlawful preparation of a derivative work than the computer program facts 
do. The defendant had, after all, "re-mixed" the recordings and hence done 
more than just copy them. Yet the court put no stress on the fact of mixing, 
and relied on Duchess Music, which did involve simple copying, without 
making the distinction. 
This line of cases, then, involving recordings under both the 1909 and 
1976 Acts, strongly supports the theory that copying an uncopyrightable 
object program infringes the source program owner's right to prepare deriva-
tive works. A similar line of cases provides inconsistent support. This sec-
ond line considers the copying not of uncopyrightable derivative works, but 
of copyrightable derivative works that have lost copyright protection. One 
such case is the Second Circuit's 1977 decision in Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, 
House Report 92-487) (emphasis added by Judge Byrne). Nimmer also roundly criticizes the deci· 
sion. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 39 § 8.04[E] at 8-60 through 8-64 & 8-60 at 39. 
59. See, e.g., Fame Publishing Co. v. Alabama Custom Tape, Inc., 507 F.2d 667 (5th Cir. 
1975); Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 506 F.2d 392 (3d Cir. 1974); 
Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Colorado Magnetics, Inc., 497 F.2d 285 (lOth Cir. 1974), all cited 
in 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 39, § 8.04[E] at 8-60 n.40. 
60. Pub. Law No. 92-140, Oct. 15, 1971, effective as of February 15, 1972, defined away the 
composition-record dilemma by defining records as copies of the compositions they embody. See 17 
U.S.C. § 101(e) (1972). 
61. 740 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1984). 
62. Id. at 722-23. The film case, Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1979), cer/. denied, 
446 U.S. 952 (1980), is almost identical to Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 509 F. Supp. 60 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), ajJ'd, 668 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1981), discussed under the "pattern" theory of protec· 
tion infra at notes 93-97. 
63. Lone Ranger Television, 740 F.2d at 720. 
64. Id. at 722. 
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Inc.,65 decided under the 1909 Copyright Act. 
Rohauer dealt with a fairly complicated factual setting. In brief, the 
owner of an independently copyrighted movie, Son of the Sheik, derived 
from a copyrighted 1925 novel under a license from the novel's author, made 
and showed a videotape copy of the movie. The movie owner's license to 
make any new movies from the novel had lapsed. The owner of the underly-
ing novel's copyright argued that copying the movie onto videotape and ex-
hibiting the tape infringed the owner's rights in the novel. The court's 
opinion dealt primarily with the question whether exhibiting the tape 
"dramatized" the novel and hence deprived the novel owner of one of the 
incidents of copyright ownership. 
The court noted in addition that copying the film onto videotape, even 
with minor changes in titles and with the addition of new music, did not 
constitute the creation of a "new version" of the movie. 66 Therefore, the 
court implicitly found that the making of the videotape was merely a copy-
ing of the movie, and hence did not infringe the novel owner's rights to make 
further derivative works based on the novel. Rohauer suggests a conclusion 
that making a copy of a derivative work, such as an object program, does not 
equal making a new derivative work, and hence cannot be controlled under 
the source program creator's right to control the "preparation of derivative 
works." 
Rohauer does not, however, compel that conclusion primarily because 
the issue was not in the least squarely presented, and secondarily because the 
case was based partly on the need to protect the movie creator's substantial 
original effort. 67 The very crux of the problem of protecting object programs 
is that they require no original effort. "Copying" a work and "preparing a 
derivative" work are quite distinct when applied to copying a movie and 
preparing a movie from a novel. The distinction almost disappears, how-
ever, when applied to object programs. To the person sitting in front of a 
computer, there is no practical difference at all between preparing an object 
program and copying that program, other than the time it takes to complete 
either operation. 
A better case to support the conclusion that copying a derivative work 
equals preparing a derivative work is the 1911 Supreme Court case, Kalem 
Company v. Harper Brothers.68 Under the 1891 Copyright Act applicable to 
the case, 69 authors had the right to control dramatizations of their works. 70 
A dramatization, at that time, evidently consisted of live actors reciting dia-
log. The Kalem Company was in the business of making motion pictures. 
Without permission, it prepared its own screenplay of the plaintifPs novel, 
Ben Hur, filmed it, and exhibited it widely. Ben Hur's author sued Kalem 
on the theory that every exhibition of the film was a dramatization of the 
65. 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977). 
66. Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 494 n.12. But see 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 39, § 3.03 at 3-12 n.19 
(criticizing Rohauer's conclusion on this point). 
67. Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 493. 
68. 222 u.s. 55 (1911). 
69. Act of March 3, 1981, c. 565, 26 Stat. 1106. 
70. Id. 
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novel. Kalem defended on the grounds that they had simply made pictures 
of various staged scenes from the novel, which did not constitute a 
"dramatization." 
The Supreme Court held that the movie exhibitions did constitute dra-
matizations of the underlying novel.71 Thus, Kalem offers support for the 
theory that copying an object program is the equivalent of preparing a deriv-
ative work. Under the 1891 Copyright Act, as under the 1976 Act, an au-
thor could not copyright a live performance as such. Similarly, an author 
cannot copyright an object program as such. Under the 1891 Act, an author 
could, however, control the preparation of the live performance as a drama-
tization of an existing copyrighted work. With computer source programs, 
an author can control the preparation of an object program as a derivative 
work. Finally, Kalem gave authors the right to control the copying of a 
dramatization onto a permanent medium, film, because the showing of the 
film constituted the doing of the controlled act: the dramatization. By par-
allel reasoning, source program authors should have the right to control the 
copying of a derivative work, the object program, because the making of the 
copy constitutes the doing of the controlled act: the preparation of the ob-
ject program as a derivative work. 
Theory number four thus proves useful for protecting object programs. 
The unauthorized copying of an object program infringes the source pro-
gram author's right to control the preparation of derivative works based on 
that source program. 
Theory Five: Copies of Source Programs 
If copying an object program and preparing an object program from a 
source program should be treated indistinguishably, as theory four suggests, 
there is still the choice of treating both operations as a copying, rather than 
treating both as a preparing. If both operations can be called "copying," 
then object programs are "copies" of their source programs. If an object 
program is a copy of a copyrightable source program, the copyright law 
ensures that no one may copy that copy. Protection for object programs is 
then assured. 
At least one federal district court has implied that object programs are 
just copies. The opinion in the Northern District of California case, GCA 
Corp. v. Chance, 72 says that both source and object versions "are to be 
treated as one work."73 If only one work is in issue, then the two versions, 
in copyright terminology, must be "copies" of it. 
Unfortunately, the definitions in the 1976 Act make it hard to describe 
an object program as a "copy" of its source program. A "copy," under the 
act, is a "material object[ ] . . . in which a work is fixed . . . and from 
which the work can be perceived. . . ."74 The primary obstacle to calling 
even a particular, tangible fixation of an object program a "copy" is that 
71. Kalem, 222 U.S. at 61. 
72. 217 U.S.P.Q. 718 (N.D. Cal. 1982). 
73. Id. at 720. 
74. 17 u.s.c. § 101 (1982). 
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"the work" cannot, in most instances, be perceived from it. "The work," 
refers presumably, to the work created by the programmer. A program 
written in a high-level language, like the brick-wall instructions example, 
once translated into the details of an object program, cannot be perceived 
from that object program. 
To be sure, an object program can be run through a "de-compiler" to 
produce a version of the program that is more easily readable by program-
mers than the ones and zeroes of object code. But the "de-compiled" version 
in no sense resembles the expression originally authored by a programmer 
working in a language like Basic or Cobol. Indeed, absent some special iden-
tifying information supplied by the translator program, one cannot examine 
an object program (or its de-compiled version) and tell what language the 
original source program was written in, let alone the particular expression 
chosen from that language by the programmer. 
In the margin are examples of two different source programs written in 
the Basic programming language.75 The two examples look different, 
though they both yield exactly the same object program. An expert knowing 
that a source program was written in Basic could tentatively reconstruct that 
program from the object program shown, but obviously could not know 
which of the two versions, or which of other possible variations, the original 
programmer had selected. When so little of the programmer's expression 
remains in the object code, it makes little sense to say that that expression-
the "work" authored by the programmer--can be perceived from the object 
code. If the work cannot be perceived, then the disc or tape or silicon chip 
containing an object program cannot be a "copy" of the source program 
within the definitions of the Copyright Act. 
Theory five, that object programs should be treated as "copies" of their 
source programs, is therefore unsuccessful. 
Theory Six: Reflections of the Source Program's "Pattern, 
The sixth approach to protecting object programs relies on cases like 
75. Program 1 
Program 2 
1 X= 1 
2 ifnotx < = 9then6 
3 print x 
4 x=x+1 











rem - this program prints the 
rem - numbers from one to nine 
. 
let number = 1 
while number < = 9 
print number 
number = number + 1 
wend 
end 
Each of these programs, when translated to object form on an IBM personal computer, yields 
the same object program (shown here as "de-compiled" with the program called "Debug"): 
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Rohauer16 that have specifically addressed the relationship of derivative 
works to their underlying works. The cases suggest a theory for finding that 
making copies of or performing a derivative work can infringe rights in the 
underlying work. The theory relies on the notion that an author's copyright 
protects more than just the literal wording of, for example, a novel, but ex-
tends also to the story line, plot, or "pattern" of the work. 
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Rohauer is only one of several cases that has wrestled with this theory, 
and one of the few that has rejected it.77 All the notable cases were decided 
under the 1909 Act,78 but the 1976 Act does not much change the bounda-
















































77. In one other case, the court rejected an argument that the pattern of an underlying work 
was copied into a derivative work and was infringed by a showing of the derivative work. See Classic 
Film Museum, Inc. v. Warner Bros., Inc., 453 F. Supp. 852 (D. Me. 1978), affd, 597 F.2d 13 (1st 
Cir. 1979). In Classic Film, Warner Brothers owned a common law copyright in the unpublished 
story and screenplay for "A Star is Born." A 1937 movie made from the screenplay had been 
copyrighted, but protection lapsed without renewal in 1965. Warner Brothers argued that any unau-
thorized showing of the movie infringed its potentially perpetual common law rights in the story and 
screenplay. The district court concluded that the perpetual protection of the movie that would result 
from this argument conflicted with the Constitutional requirement that copyrights subsist for a lim-
ited time. 453 F. Supp. at 855. The case may have been correctly decided as a matter of pre-1976 
Copyright Act law, but by the time the district court's decision was issued, the basis for the decision 
was no longer valid. When the 1976 Act became effective on January I, 1978, perpetual protection 
for unpublished works was replaced with the same limited term of protection applied to published 
works. 17 U.S.C. §§ 303, 302 (1976). The district court noted the effect of the change in the law, 
453 F. Supp. at 856 n.4, but applied pre-1978 copyright law. Though technically correct, perhaps, 
the decision is illegal. 
78. Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952 (1980); Classic 
Film Museum v. Warner Bros., 597 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1979); Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 
F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977); Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 
509 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affd, 668 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1981); Grove Press v. Greenleaf Pub-
lishing Co., 247 F. Supp. 518 (E.D.N.Y. 1965). 
79. The 1976 Act allows any grant of rights by an author to be terminated between 35 and 40 
years after the date of the grant. This right to terminate cannot be waived or assigned, but does 
descend to the author's surviving spouse and children or grandchildren. See 17 U.S.C. § 203. 
An author may, of course, grant rights to another to produce a derivative work. That grant, 
like any other, may be terminated after 35 years in accord with section 203 of the Act. The 1976 Act 
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The issues are multiple: what happens to an underlying work when a 
derivative work falls into the public domain and vice-versa? Can the rights 
of the underlying work's owner be infringed by anything done with the de-
rivative work and vice-versa? In this latter context, does it make any differ-
ence if the derivative work is in the public domain? 
For these issues, a few answers exist. A derivative work's entering the 
public domain will not drag the underlying work with it. The wording of 
both the 1909 and 1976 Acts says as much;80 the legislative history to the 
1909 Act says so expressly;81 and the Rohauer case has interpreted the 1909 
Act as saying so. 82 There is also authority for the opposite situation: a de-
rivative work falling into the public domain may sometimes be rescued by 
the copyright on the underlying work. A rescue attempt of just this sort has 
succeeded in at least three cases, 83 of which two will serve as examples-
Grove Press v. Greenleaft Publishing Co. 84 and Film video Releasing Corp. v. 
Hastings. 85 
In Grove Press, Jean Genet, French author of Le Journal du Valeur 
(The Thiers Journal), had authorized an English-language translation of his 
novel. The translator failed to comply with certain United States copyright 
formalities and the English translation, which would be termed a derivative 
work under the 1976 Act, fell into the public domain. A third party, recog-
nizing that the English version was uncopyrighted, reproduced that version 
for sale and was sued by the translator. 
The court found that the third party's reproduction of the un-
copyrighted English-language version included many of the copyrightable 
elements of Genet's original French work, including "the entire plot, scenes, 
characters and dialogue of the novel, i.e., the format and pattern."86 Later 
the court used the word "pattern" several times, emphasizing that copyright 
in a novel protects more than just its literal wording. 87 The third party was 
enjoined from reproducing and selling the reproduction. 88 
The effect of the decision was to take a work that anyone had a right to 
expect was in the public domain, out of the public domain. The decision has 
been criticized for failing to vindicate copyright policies (under the 1909 
specifies that the recipient of the grant who produces the derivative work may continue to exploit 
that work after the grant's termination. 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1). 
It is in just this context-the production of a derivative work under terms of a grant that is later 
terminated-that the 1976 Act clarifies the relationship of derivative to underlying works. See gen-
erally 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 39, § 3.07[A] at 3-23 through 3-32 (1983). 
80. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 7, 35 Stat. 1077; 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1982). 
81. See Joint Hearing before the House and Senate Committees on Patents, (March 26, 1908), 
(testimony ofW.B. Hale), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT K-76 
(1976), quoted in Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484, 489 (2d Cir. 1977). 
82. Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 489. 
83. In addition to Grove Press and Filmvideo, discussed in the accompanying text, see Russell v. 
Price, 612 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952 (1980). 
84. 247 F. Supp. 518 (E.D.N.Y. 1965). 
85. 509 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 668 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1981). 
86. Grove Press, 247 F. Supp. at 525. 
87. Presumably, the notion of copyright protecting the pattern of a work derives from a 1945 
article by Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 503 
(1945). Chafee used the term as an "imaginative description of what should not be imitated." Id. at 
513. 
88. Grove Press, 247 F. Supp. at 528. 
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Act), when the occasion to do so at little cost arose. 89 "Little cost" because 
the contrary decision would still have left Genet with the right to license all 
other derivative works, including any new, authorized English transla-
tions, 90 and would not have barred any member of the public from copying a 
work left unprotected by copyright law. 
On the other hand, the decision has been supported by arguments that 
translations are a unique form of derivative work because they so closely 
resemble their underlying, original works. Other derivative works in the 
public domain should remain free for copying, so the argument goes, but 
translations rely on the original author's contribution to such an extent that 
they should not.91 
Several cases similar to Grove Press have arisen, not over translations, 
but over the rights to motion picture films derived from novels or plays. 
Rohauer, already discussed,92 came out differently from Grove Press, with 
the court's refusal to find protectible elements of the Son of the Sheik novel 
infringed by the movie. The Second Circuit later almost repudiated 
Rohauer, however, in Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings,93 a 1981 
decision. 
Filmvideo arose from author Clarence Mulford's 1935 grant of motion 
picture rights in his Hopalong Cassidy novels. The movies were made and 
copyrighted, but the copyrights lapsed because of the proprietor's failure to 
renew them in the 1960's. The novels' copyrights were renewed and con-
tinue in effect today. 
The owner of the films sought a declaratory judgment that the novels 
were in the public domain because of an invalid renewal, or that the movies 
were in the public domain and could be shown freely. The district court 
never questioned that films in the public domain could infringe a still pro-
tected novel. The only questions were whether the novels were protected, 
whether the films were in the public domain, and whether the films did in 
fact substantially copy from the novels. The district court, after reading 
twenty-six Hopalong Cassidy novels and viewing twenty-seven hours of 
Hopalong Cassidy films, answered all three questions affirmatively.94 Some 
of the films were found to infringe the Cassidy books' characters, and others 
the storyline.95 The district court's conclusions were affirmed by the Second 
Circuit,96 with a careful distinction of Rohauer and a reference to that deci-
sion's "minor aberration" from the usual rule espoused in Grove Press and 
similar cases. 97 
Both Grove Press and Film video support the conclusion that object pro-
89. See Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. CoPYRIGHT 
Soc'y U.S.A. 209, 245-46 (1983). 
90. Id. at 246. 
91. See Nevins, The Doctrine of Copyright Ambush: Limitations on the Free Use of Public Do-
main Derivative Works, 25 ST. Louts U.L.J. 58, 79-80 (1981). 
92. See supra text accompanying notes 65-67. 
93. 668 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1981). 
94. Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 509 F. Supp. 60, 62, 65-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 
668 F.2d 91, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1981). 
95. Id. at 66. 
96. 668 F.2d 91, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1981). 
97. Id. at 93. 
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grams, though uncopyrightable, may not be copied without infringing the 
underlying source program. Object programs lack copyright for a reason 
different from the English translation of Genet's work or the Hopalong Cas-
sidy films: object programs lack creative authorship altogether. Yet that 
lack is not a consequence of the source program author's fault in any sense, 
nor should it justify depriving the author of the most significant market by 
far for his works. 
The Grove Press line of cases is based on the granting of copyright pro-
tection to an author's story line or pattern of incidents. The theory evolved 
in the context of novels and movies, raising the question whether there is 
enough of an analogy to this "pattern" notion in the context of computer 
programs to justify its application there. 
On the surface, object programs reveal very little about their source 
program forebearers, as the earlier examples show.98 Yet, all three examples 
do have something akin to a common "pattern": they all cause a very simi-
lar sequence of events to take place inside the computer. The "sequence of 
events" in a program or computer sounds a lot like the "sequence of events" 
in a novel. It does make sense, then, to say that object programs reflect the 
pattern, that is, the sequence of events, of their source programs and can be 
protected against copying even if they are not independently copyrightable. 
A second question arises, of course, as to whether the generous judicial 
deference to the concept of pattern in a novel or movie ought to be carried 
over to far more utilitarian works like computer programs, even if that 
carry-over can be done conceptually. A program's sequence of events, after 
all, might be said to resemble the process performed by the program. 
Processes have not been the subject of copyright protection at least since the 
1879 decision, Baker v. Se/den.99 The CONTU Final Report quoted the 
House and Senate reports on the 1976 Act as saying that "the expression 
adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable element in a computer pro-
gram, and that the actual processes or methods embodied in the program are 
not within the scope of the copyright law."100 
By itself, a reference to "expression" or "process" does not resolve the 
issue of which is which in a computer program. CONTU tried to resolve 
that issue by comparing programs to games: "One may not adopt and re-
publish or redistribute copyrighted game rules, but the copyright owner has 
no power to prevent others from playing the game." 101 The analogy breaks 
down with computer programs because with programs, the "rules," or pro-
gram statements, "play the game" themselves. 
To be sure, CONTU recognized that the process-expression distinction 
must ultimately be drawn by courts in individual cases.102 Yet, the Final 
Report contains a hint that at least one CONTU commissioner implicitly 
understood that object programs are different from source programs. At a 
98. See supra note 95. 
99. 101 u.s. 99 (1879). 
100. CONTU Report, supra note 12, at 19 (emphasis added by CONTU). 
101. /d. at 20. 
102. Id. at 21. 
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CONTU hearing, Commissioner Arthur Miller questioned well-known com-
puter expert and author Daniel McCracken: 
Commissioner Miller: How many different ways are there to produce 
program ... ? 
Mr. McCracken: An infinite number in principle, and in practice doz-
ens, hundreds. 
Commissioner Miller: So it is comparable to the theoretically infinite 
number of ways of writing Hamlet? 
Mr. McCracken: I believe so. It is not really true that there is a very 
restrictive way to write program. . . .to3 
This conversation immediately suggests that there exists a Hamlet apart 
from the particular words chosen by Shakespeare, and similarly, that there 
exists a program apart from the particular words chosen by the programmer. 
In the same fashion, there must exist a Thief's Journal apart from the words 
used by Genet. 
In Grove Press, it was just this non-verbal Thief's Journal that the court 
protected; in Filmvideo, it was the Hopalong Cassidy stories. The quoted 
dialogue appears in the CONTOU Final Report in the context of a discus-
sion of the idea-expression distinction in copyright law. CONTU seems al-
most certainly to have used this notion of "hundreds of ways to write a 
program" to draw a line: the hundred ways are protectible expressions; "the 
program" is the unprotectible idea or process. 104 
Now the problem of protecting an object program as a form of expres-
sion is clearer: is not the object program itself "the program" that hundreds 
of source programs might be written to express? How then can it be a pro-
tectible expression itself?105 One answer to this question is that the two 
source programming examples shown above106 are so short that they are 
trivial-they would certainly be too short to sustain a copyright.to7 They 
might produce the same object program, but different versions of non-trivial 
source programs would surely not do so. Besides, once produced, an object 
program is fixed-otherwise we could not speak rigorously of comparing 
two object programs. When one speaks of Hamlet or "a program" apart 
from particular words, one speaks of something not fixed. 
Fixation makes something an expression, though cases like Grove Press 
show that we do not confine the term, "expression," only to a single, particu-
lar fixation. Thus we come back to the conclusion that perhaps a non-trivial 
103. Id. at 20 n.106 (emphasis added). 
104. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983), 
cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984). 
1 OS. Indeed, copyright's pervasive notion of unexpressed, hence uncopyrightable, "ideas" is a 
theoretical concept that may not be correct at all. Philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein pointed out 
that perhaps nothing underlies expressions. What we take to be a variety of surface manifestations of 
something intangible and far down in the "levels of abstraction", see Nichols v. Universal Pictures 
Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), may simply be a family of related expressions. When we see a 
human family whose members all look very much alike, we do not necessarily conclude that there 
exists a single, underlying family member-not an ancestor, but an abstract family member-from 
whom all this family derives. L. WIITGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION~~ 65-67 at 3Je-
32e (G.E.M. Ansombe trans. 1968). 
106. See supra note 75. 
107. See CONTU Report, supra note 12, at 20. 
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object program is an expression, and that not just other source programs, 
but other object programs could exist that would produce the same effect 
when run on a computer. Only one hurdle to protection now remains: If 
several different object programs produce the same effect, how different can 
their expressions be? Different enough to sustain copyright protection? 
Different object programs accomplishing the same effect can be different 
in the efficiency with which they accomplish it. 108 For example, to multiply 
two numbers like 156 and 6, programmers could instruct a computer to mul-
tiply: "156 X 6." Or they could request the computer to add 156 six times: 
"156 + 156 + 156 + 156 + 156 + 156." Or they could even ask the 
reverse: "6 + 6 + 6 ... + 6" (156 times). Although the choice of the 
most efficient procedure here seem obvious, other procedures for other tasks 
have less obvious answers. 109 
A complicated array of choices thus faces every programmer. Once the 
overall function of a program is determined, the authorship of the program's 
source code consists largely in the selection and ordering of numerous small 
procedures, known in the programming trade as "algorithms."110 If any of 
the "pattern" of the source program is reflected in the object program, it is 
in the ordering of these procedures. Because different object programs can 
perform the same function, yet use different procedures to do so, each of the 
different object programs may legitimately be viewed as an expression. 
Now the "pattern" theory looks sound: source programs contain a pat-
tern in their selection and ordering of procedures; the object version of a 
program reflects that pattern; and though not independently copyrightable, 
an object program can be protected precisely because it copies the pattern of 
the source program. 
A second line of reasoning supports this conclusion. Even though the 
programmer's surface expression in a source program is not perceptible in 
the program's object version, the latter version retains a substantial market 
value because of that expression. Careful wording of source programs, pro-
duced from a carefully chosen programming language, can greatly reduce 
the likelihood of programming errors. Errors can never demonstrably be 
eliminated, but proper programming techniques can minimize the risk of 
errors. 111 Those techniques have to do entirely with the programmer's selec-
tion and ordering of the words and statements of the chosen programming 
language112-in short, the techniques have everything to do with the 
programmer's expression. That expression, in tum, leads to a marketable 
108. See id. at 20 n.l06 (remarks of Comm'r Miller). 
109. Frequently programmers must direct a computer to see if a given word is contained in a 
long list of words. For example, many word processing programs have an associated "spelling 
checker." The spelling program takes each word in turn from a word processing document and 
looks it up in a dictionary. When a computer "looks up" a word, it must compare it letter by letter 
with words in the dictionary to find a matching word. Should the letter-by-letter comparison be 
made from left to right, or from right to left? 
110. J. TREMBLAY AND R. BUNT, AN INTRODUCfiON TO COMPUTER SCIENCE 34-35, 63 
(1979). 
111. D. VAN TASSEL, PROGRAM STYLE, DESIGN, EFFICIENCY, DEBUGGING, AND TESTING, 
119-120 (1981). 
112. See id. at 117-154. 
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commodity: relatively error-free object programs. 113 
What makes different object programs performing the same function 
recognizably distinct, then, is both the efficiency with which they perform 
and their reliability or freedom from errors. In the former sense, the "pat-
tern" of the source program expression is very much reflected in the object 
program; in the latter sense a valuable attribute of the programmer's expres-
sion, reliability, is also reflected. The Grove Press analysis seems very much 
to the point. 
Critics of the Grove Press case and its pattern theory have pointed to 
copyright's policy of providing an incentive to authorship. They argue that 
incentives to authors will not diminish materially if others are allowed to 
copy public domain derivative works. 114 For Genet and Le Journal du 
Voleur, all other derivative works remained his for exploitation. Further-
more, authors in the future can protect themselves from the failure by licen-
sees like Genet's translator and publisher, or like Paramount Pictures in the 
Filmvideo case, to preserve a derivative work's copyright, by requiring in-
demnity clauses in their licensing contracts.115 
Neither the incentive argument nor the licensee's indemnity argument, 
however, applies to the market for computer source programs. First, source 
programs have very little market if they cannot be translated into object 
programs;116 at least with today's preferences, a source program cannot be 
reworked into a movie or a television series. If the market for the object 
program version of a source program is lost because the object program is in 
the public domain, almost the entire value of the source program is lost, and 
hence, almost all the incentive to program authorship. Second, the transla-
tion from source to object is not performed under a licensing agreement; 
indemnity for a licensee's failings is therefore not possible. Indemnity makes 
no sense anyway because the lack of copyright protection for object pro-
grams is not a question of someone's failure to take proper steps, but rather a 
result of the wording of the Copyright Act. 
The need for incentives, the inappropriateness of an indemnity agree-
ment, and the theory that derivative works reflect the pattern of their under-
lying works all support the treatment of object programs as protectible 
entities. 
CONCLUSION 
Computer programs in a form ready for execution by a computer still 
pose a dilemma for copyright law, even after the 1976 Copyright Act and the 
1980 Amendments. "Object programs" do not readily fit into the definitions 
113. The market's concern over bug-laden programs has resulted recently in the formation of 
independent program testing organizations. See J. von Alten, Getting the Software Bugs Out: In-
dependent Testers Come to the Rescue of Consumers, 6 INFOWORLD No. 37, at 47 (Sept. 10, 1984). 
114. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 73, at 239-40, 246, 252. 
115. See id. at 246. 
116. A market does exist for instructional texts about programming and for books of unsophisti-
cated programs in the BASIC language. The market for software is dominated, however, by expen-
sive, complex programs sold to the business community in the form of object programs. See, e.g., 
Survey of Software Users, 225 (No. 12) PUBLISHERS' WEEKLY 50 (Mar. 23, 1984). 
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under the 1976 Act as independent literary works because they do not em-
body any originality or human authorship. Object programs look much like 
translations and may fit, though not exceedingly well, into the "derivative 
works" category. As a derivative work, an object program still cannot sus-
tain an independent copyright, however, because it lacks originality and au-
thorship. Nor can an object program be considered a joint work of the 
source program author and the author of the source-to-object translating 
program. Joint works result from a merger of two or more expressions; none 
of the translating program's expression shows up in the object programs it 
produces. Finally, the appealing notion that object programs are "copies" of 
their source programs fails to comport with the statutory definition of 
"copy." A copy is something from which the original work can be per-
ceived. For programs written in a language like Basic or Cobol, the 
programmer's expression is lost in the translation to object code and be-
comes imperceptible. 
Congress would doubtless prefer that the Copyright Act be read so that 
protection could be given to object programs without further legislative ef-
fort. 117 Two copyright theories can be used to justify protection. First, the 
process of preparing an object program is so mechanical and so similar to 
copying that preparing and copying should be treated alike. With this ap-
proach, anyone "copying" an object program could be considered to be 
"preparing" one in violation of the program author's right to prepare deriva-
tive works under section 106(2) of the Act. The advantage to this theory 
and the pattern theory, below, is that authors may control the preparation of 
derivative works even if those works are not capable of sustaining copyright 
protection themselves. 
The second copyright theory draws on Grove Press and similar cases to 
suggest that an object program reflects the copyrightable "pattern" of the 
source program to such an extent that the object program may not be copied 
even if it is itself uncopyrightable. The pattern of a source program consists 
of the selection and sequence of its procedures and the freedom from errors 
that follows from the programmer's careful choice of source program 
expressions. 
Neither of these copyright theories seems to fall like ripe fruit from the 
Act. Perhaps the difficulty stems from the nature of computer programs: 
they are sui generis, both within copyright law and within human 
experience. 
Congress could, of course, provide a kind of sui generis protection 
scheme for programs. That would not make much sense, though. When the 
market for goods such as computer programs is a market for easily-produced 
117. "Congress probably wanted the courts to interpret the definitional provisions of the new act 
flexibly, so that it would cover new technologies as they appeared, rather than to interpret those 
provisions narrowly and so force Congress periodically to update the act." WGN Continental 
Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622, 627 (7th Cir. 1982). The WGN case inter-
preted a television transmission that included a separate textual display as a single audiovisual work, 
so that licensee television stations were not allowed to split the two signals without permission. The 
signal was truly a "new technology," and the court's analysis was undoubtedly correct. Computer 
programs were not a new technology in 1976; it is unfortunate that CONTU, and hence the Con-
gress, did not face up to the problem of classifying object programs when the Act was still in process. 
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copies of an intangible work, the copyright system is about as effective a 
device as one could hope for. Most other countries have already adopted 
copyright as the protection of choice for computer programs, 118 as have a 
number of United States courts. It seems late to start from scratch. 
Perhaps, if the theories offered here are unsatisfactory, and if a new 
form of sui generis protection is inappropriate, a few minor touch-ups to the 
1976 Act would do the job. First, Congress could simply declare that object 
programs are to be considered "copies" of their source programs. This 
change could be accomplished by adding a sentence or two to the Act's defi-
nitions of "copy" and "computer program." A short addition to the defini-
tions would do nothing to alter the existing Act's scheme or theory of 
protection; the possibility that a source program could lack sufficient origi-
nality for copyright would remain; the possibility that a source program's 
originality might lie so much in its ideas, not its expression, that it would be 
uncopyrightable would also remain as it is currently. 
Second, Congress could take note that the Act's section 102 list of sev-
eral categories of copyrightable works is not exclusive.119 Computer pro-
grams could simply be removed from the "literary works" category and put 
into a newly-created category for "computer program works." This cate-
gory would be defined to include only source programs. Congress could 
then add a new exclusive right to the list of rights currently given in section 
106. That right would be, in the case of computer programs, to prepare, 
distribute, and execute on a computer any versions of the work. 
This change would get to the heart of the problem with computer pro-
grams-that unauthorized copies are not just read or observed, but used for 
their functions. It would deviate more than the first suggested change from 
traditional copyright doctrine, which has focused primarily on copying and 
selling works, not on using them. But the deviation is no greater than that 
necessary, for example, to protect the use in the form of performances of 
plays, a "deviation" so well ingrained in copyright law that no one would 
argue against it. 
Hardly any disinterested observer would assert that computer object 
programs should go unprotected entirely; the debate is whether copyright is 
the appropriate means of protection. When a few modest theories, or failing 
that, a few modest changes to the Act will suffice to accomplish that protec-
tion, the question really becomes: why not copyright? 
118. See Brazil Considering Sui Generis Form of Protection for Software, 28 PAT., TRADE, & 
CORP. J. 482,482-83 (B.N.A. Aug. 30, 1984) (mentioning that sui generis protection is disfavored by 
many authorities, and that copyright is already relied on by the United States, the Philippines, Hun-
gary, and several Latin American countries, all by statute, and by France, the Netherlands, West 
Germany, Australia and Japan by case Jaw). See also Pub. L. No. 98-573, The International Trade 
and Investment Act, October 30, 1984, section 251: "[C]opyright protection is afforded computer 
software by most industrialized nations including Japan, the Netherlands, France, the Federal Re-
public of Germany, the United Kingdom, South Africa, Hungary, Taiwan, and Australia .•.• " 
reprinted in COPYRIGHT LAW REPORTS CCH ~ 20,281 at 10,743. 
The Congress may not be wholly averse to sui generis protection schemes: just such a mecha-
nism was recently enacted to protect certain steps in the process of creating semiconductor chips for 
computers and other electronic devices. See Pub. L. No. 98-620, tit. III, Nov. 8, 1984. 
119. H. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. 
NEWS 5659, 5666. 
